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Nineteenth century Malthusian theory gained significant attention at the outbreak of World War I.
Beginning with his 1798 book Essay on the Principle of Population, Thomas Malthus had argued
that war served as a check on population when resources became scarce. His work gained a
substantial number of followers. During the modernist era of science and progress that unfolded
after 1900, neo-Malthusians observed real conditions leading to war, but they were now less
willing to accept war as inevitable. They looked more carefully at Malthus’s assertions that
overpopulation would lead to competition for resources and hence into violent conflict, and noted
that humankind now had within its hands the power to control births.
The scientific community added arguments of Charles Darwin, who, according to the prominent
neo-Malthusian V. Drysdale, “has shown beyond the possibility of dispute that over-reproduction
leads to a constant struggle for existence. Animal life is one perpetual conflict, and man too has
been in a constant state of war—the impelling force being really, although not always ostensibly,
the need for food.”1 Opponents argued that birth rates in Europe had been declining and policy
makers should instead address food supply and distribution, which would make the control of
births unnecessary. Darwin, himself, did not condone family limitation and considered artificial
checks to natural population growth as problematic and detrimental to healthy family life.2 Yet,
Malthusianism prevailed among intellectuals and the upper classes, drawing from the teachings of
natural selection.3
Before the outbreak of the First World War and during its execution, observers also wrote on
Malthusianism within a framework of militarism. The contemporary state of Europe drew
significant attention from Malthusians, and in the United States, they argued that rational,
progressive thinkers should view the Europeans’ tendency toward war with disgust. In this
“Progressive Era” it seemed unimaginable to them that self-proclaimed civilizations could not
resolve their conflict without resorting to arms.
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Edwin W. James described the increasing destructiveness of weaponry and war in “The
Malthusian Doctrine and War,” published in the Scientific Monthly in 1916. Late nineteenth
century technology that advanced transportation, industrialization, and economic expansion in
Western Europe and the United States also contributed to innovations in warfare, he wrote, and
nations with access to chemicals, explosives, modern steel-making processes, and mass
production, applied them to war technology. Capitalist competition between and among nationalist
economies added strong undercurrents to militarist preparations, creating an increasingly
dangerous environment that many believed was sure to lead to war.
James described a world in which historical ills may have been eradicated while an inclination
toward war was amplified. “In at least two of the great western nations compulsory military service
has existed for many years; in several others large standing armies and powerful navies have been
maintained in times of peace,” he noted. “While the public mind has been turned toward
ameliorating the harshness of famine and pestilence, it has been accustomed to consider war as a
possible contingency, not to be combated as undesirable but to be prepared for.” The preparations
for war guaranteed an increase in intensity and destructiveness of human life when it did come.
James argued that man had become desensitized to the military culture surrounding him, paying
taxes to support it, always aware of army units and naval fleets nearby, his children playing on
fortification ramps and slopes while vacationing at seaside resorts. In some cases, he served in
militias or attended military school. “The individual mind finds no shock in considering a resort
to war.”4
James reminded readers Malthus had argued that because resources multiplied only arithmetically
while population multiplied geometrically, there would be shortages. If population were not
checked through preventive measures such as delayed marriage, it would ultimately be limited
through positive measures, such as famine, disease, and war. As famine and disease had been
alleviated by modern man, the only positive check remaining was war. And because man had been
so conditioned to accept war as inevitable—through “civilized” society’s creation of a military
culture—he was accepting the only positive check left, according to Malthusianism, which could
meet and temper the pressures of population.
There were aspects of modern society that Malthus could not have taken into account and the
capacity for which transformed even further in the nineteenth century, creating an even wider
chasm between his analyses and the world at the turn of the twentieth century. First, Malthus
described what might be considered pre-modern societies where lack of food, for example, directly
led to individuals turning on one another. In more modern economies and governing systems,
however, the individual was more remotely and indirectly connected with military action. While
individuals were recruited and assigned to engage in war, decisions to declare war were made at
much higher levels. In addition, it was only necessary for governments to give the impression that
there were economic pressures or scarcity of resources so severe as to make danger imminent.
Second, sensibilities regarding “necessities” had shifted through the nineteenth century. A growing
middle class had become reliant on a certain standard of living which expanded their notion of
essentials beyond food and water and engaging in war for the sake of protecting a certain standard
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of living against all others had become more likely. As modern war took place between and
among nations, orchestrated by nations’ leaders, it became more critical to look at unequal
distribution of wealth in natural resources. The acquisition of petroleum and metals such as iron
and copper needed for industrial strength and consequently increased accumulation of capital
might occur because of an advantageous geographical position and chance location. While
disadvantaged nations could practice conservation and frugality, there may come a day when they
resort to war in order to forcibly share in the wealth denied to them by circumstance.
A consciousness of global inequity and the potential for war due to lack of accessibility of
resources or perceived economic pressures inspired peace movements. However, an enlightened
attitude toward international relations should not be comprised simply of propaganda in favor of
peace for the sake of peace, wrote James. Rather, the causes of true economic pressures must be
removed. Recommendations included advancements in science and rural development, making
rural life more attractive, elimination of trade restrictions, agreements, and tariffs in order to permit
free trade among all nations, the abolition of absolutism, and greater efficiency in republican forms
of government. In addition, governments should legalize the dissemination of contraceptive
information.5
The summer of 1914 had marked a peak in pacifism in the United States. The new century had
ushered in progressive ideals of cleaning up corruption in government and business, implementing
programs of economic justice, expanding democratic institutions including the right to vote for
women, alleviating social ills through public health, nutrition programs, and child labor laws, and
in essence eliminating many of what progressives termed the root causes of conflict. Peace would
stem naturally from such an environment, they believed. By 1917, however, militarism became an
integral part of culture. Pacifists did not see this as the exception; rather, an intensification of the
norm. They strove hard to infuse the populace with pacifistic sensibilities, but the outbreak of the
Great War and the Americanization of what was to become the First World War seemed to tear
those efforts apart.
In addition, it became clearer that the U.S. was not, at its foundation, a peaceful nation at all. With
the onset of war and eventual U.S. entrance in 1916, plans for international arbitration were
dropped, as were movements toward toleration for minorities, greater freedom of conscience, and
freedom of speech.6 Elsie Clews Parsons explained why she believed the American public became
acculturated so easily to recent militaristic patterns. She noted how Americans exhibited preexistent resemblances which lent themselves to militarism:
Negro disenfranchisement, segregation and lynching suggested that racial discrimination
is not altogether alien to American practice. A number of instances in the treatment
accorded to Hebrews might also be cited in this connection, as well as certain attitudes
towards immigrants, particularly immigrants from southern or southeastern Europe.
Americanization, whether conscious or unconscious, is characterized not only by racial
discrimination, it insists on homogeneity, and the homogeneity or like-mindedness it

5

Ibid., pp. 267-271.

6

Elsie Clews Parsons, “Patterns for Peace or War,” The Scientific Monthly 5:3 (September, 1917), p. 230.
1A3–3

PAPER 1A3 – KATHLEEN A. TOBIN
demands permits of so little variation that we are led to question whether respect or
tolerance for minorities in general is a notable American trait.7

Pacifists also warned that businesses and corporations benefited greatly from militarism; the
buildup of armaments brought profits and replenishment after the use of those armaments brought
even more profits. When society saw economic benefit in war, leaders were less inclined to address
basic weaknesses that led to war. The price paid for this superficial boost to the economy was
further human destruction, even more widespread and brutal destruction as advances in technology
led to greater casualties. Further, corporations were exempt from regular taxes as they contributed
to the war effort, placing increased burdens on the working class who sacrificed through their labor
and increased taxes to pay for defense. World War I was referred to as a “rich man’s war.”8
At times, pacifists used terms such as hysteria and epidemic of fear when describing the newfound
intensity of militarism in American society during the war. Columbia University Professor of
Sociology and History of Civilization, Franklin H. Giddings, dismissed such rhetoric, arguing that
it was reasonable to expect one percent of the male population to serve in the military. Adjusting
for age and ability, a force of one million would represent five percent of the population, still
realistic, though pacifists would consider it monstrous. The term militaristic might appropriately
be used to describe Europe, he said, with German forces—those organized plus those trained but
not organized combined—numbered 8,000,000 in a country of less than 70,000,000. Organized
forces in the six greater nations of Europe—Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, Italy, and
Great Britain—totaled 25,000,000. He concluded a U.S. force of 1,000,000 should not be
considered evidence of militarism.
In addition, the United States was comprised of significantly more territory than European nations,
given the area of Alaska and possessions abroad. This gave the U.S. more coastline to protect and
also a less dense population overall. The lack of population density would make any military
presence less noticeable. A million-man force, supported by five million in reserves should have
no effect on American domestic life. “It would be neither more nor less appreciable than a police
force of 15,000 men in [the] city of Philadelphia, with its population of more than one million and
a half inhabitants,” wrote Giddings.9 Giddings argued that the democratic nature of military service
requirements strengthened democracy, and that military training was beneficial in and of itself. It
instilled discipline, responsibility, love of country, loyalty, and obedience in young men.10
Throughout history, he contended, democracies and republics did not become militaristic, while
monarchies always did, or tended to become so. Democracies had nothing to gain and everything
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to lose by engaging in an aggressive war. But they placed themselves in danger by failing to
protect themselves against aggression of the ruthless.11
While many intellectual leaders argued that fundamental tenets of modern civilization should
prevent war, age-old connections between population, manpower, and military might did not die.
The connections were rooted in biblical descriptions equating the bearing of sons as the increase
of arrows in one’s quiver. Some might expect that technological advances in weaponry would
make such ancient connections irrelevant, but that was not the case. The capacity for destruction
and lives lost only increased, and if a nation were to remain strong—in militarists’ eyes,
Malthusians feared—population should remain strong.
In addition, medical advances had contributed to rapid increases in population, and a higher
standard of living created higher demands on resources in developed nations and their colonies.
From 1800 to the onset of World War I, the world’s population nearly tripled, from 640,000,000
to 1,693,000,000. The greatest growth occurred not in less developed regions, but in wealthier
countries. While birth rates dropped alongside industrialization, so did death rates, with better
health lowering infant mortality and extending longevity. Europe’s population increased from
127,000,000 in 1741 to 452,000,000 in 1914, and similar growth appeared to take hold wherever
there was British influence, or what was often termed Western civilization. Areas that exhibited
tremendous population growth in the same period included the United States, Australia, South
Africa, Egypt, Argentina, and the Philippines.12 In addition to food supply, the British were also
concerned about continuing increases in consumption of coal. Nearly all industries had become
dependent on coal, either directly or indirectly. In addition, an abundant supply of coal was
required to maintain Britain’s position in global trade, and the export of manufactured goods was
necessary for increased exchange of food imports. As Britain was importing a majority of its food,
its coal reserves were diminishing by millions of tons annually. Very importantly, coal could not
be regenerated and replenished as agricultural produce could. It was estimated that in 1801, Britain
consumed more than ten million tons of coal per year and by the onset of World War I was
consuming more than 263 million tons per year.13 He referred to the classic work, The Coal
Question, in which Professor W. S. Jevons warned in the 1860s, “We cannot long continue our
present rate of progress. The first check to our growing prosperity must render our population
excessive.”14
In his 1917 work Essays in Wartime, Havelock Ellis criticized those who did not see a problem in
recent trends in population growth. He was a friend and associate of Margaret Sanger, leader of
the birth control movement, and a strong proponent of birth control himself. He was particularly
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hard on religious figures and condemned contemporary references to the biblical order to
“increase and multiply,” describing it as an “authoritative command of a tribal God who
was, according to the scriptural narrative, addressing a world inhabited by eight people.” The world
of the early twentieth century was a starkly different place, he reminded. Still, some professed
patriots held onto this notion in their “clamoring for plentiful and cheap men.” While it may have
been considered a religious, moral, natural, scientific, and patriotic duty at one time, the earth
could no longer withstand the practice of having as many children as possible. This, he said, set
the stage for war.15
Ellis agreed that war may well affect the quality of the new race detrimentally, and there was no
doubt of the effects—while perhaps temporary—on the quantity of men. While there may be a
brief increase in birth rates once veterans returned home, the drafting of a large portion of young
men in the first place diminished the population through the “pouring out [of] the blood of the
young manhood of the race,” said Ellis.
The wars of a century spill 120,000,000 gallons of blood, enough to fill three million fortygallon casks, or to create a perpetual fountain sending up a jet of 150 gallons per hour, a
fountain which has been flowing unceasingly ever since the dawn of history. It is to be
noted, also, that those slain on the battlefield by no means represent the total victims of a
wary, but only about half of them.16

Ellis also looked more directly at the eugenic effects of war. “For war never hits men at random.
It only hits a carefully selected percentage of ‘fit’ men. It tends, in other words, to strike out
temporarily, or in a fatal event, permanently, from the class of fathers precisely that percentage of
the population which the eugenist wishes to see in that class.” He went on:
For, however an army is recruited, it is only those men reaching a fairly high standard of
fitness who are accepted, and these, even in times of peace, are hampered in the task of
carrying out the race, which the less fit and the unfit are free to do at their gown good
pleasure. At the time of the Napoleonic Wars, the age of conscription was lowered to
eighteen and marriage was an exemption from service. This resulted in many young men
marrying hastily to avoid the draft, certainly injurious to the race.17

Ellis blamed German militarists for advocating for war, in part, because they saw it as a
regenerator—a process that would strengthen the hardiness of the future German population.
According to Hegel, “War invigorates humanity, as storms preserve the sea from putrescence.” To
Molke, “War is an integral part of God’s universe, developing man’s noblest attributes.” To
Treitschke, “The condemnation of war is not only absurd, it is immoral.”18 A recently unified
imperial Germany adopted expansion as a primary foreign policy, coming comparatively late to
the colonization process and thus turning its attention toward neighboring nations on the continent
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of Europe. The Geopolitiker argued that nation-states were organically expansive and the
obvious result of population pressure in a growing nation.19
Adelyne More disputed major claims against the use of artificial contraception, saying it was the
most effective way to limit births and that limiting births had a number of advantages. First, it was
the only way women could hope to attain independence and self-development, which were key to
the progress of humanity as a whole. Second, it was the most effective way to alleviate infant
mortality, as mothers would have more sufficient time and attention to devote to each child. Next,
it was necessary to limit family size if one wished to better his or her economic situation. More
also argued that modern prophylaxis (through the use of rubber condoms and diaphragms)
prevented the spread of venereal disease. And very importantly the regulation of population was
“the most effective way of ensuring the cessation of war.” She maintained that the feeling of
expansion when brought up against geographical barriers acted blindly in the direction of conflict,
whether in colonial rivalry or territorial “swarming.” In addition, the lowering of social conditions
due to overpopulation made people long for a change of any kind, and at any price. They may not
consciously desire war, but their resistance to the powerful interests which flourish on war was
weakened to a dangerous degree.20
According to More, industrialization could not be considered a primary cause of a declining birth
rate, as it fell rapidly between 1870 and 1900 in much of Europe and after 1900 in Germany, after
industry began flourishing. She argued it was simply because women of the upper classes had
decided not to have as many children. Though birth rates continued to decline during the first years
of the war, More feared they might quickly rise once the conflict had come to an end. Militarists
in Germany could appeal for more births once again on the grounds of patriotism, particularly if
they viewed the Russians and English as producing too many babies. This appeal, she reminded,
was the one remaining source of danger—the primary basis for wars in the past.21
Physician and birth control advocate C. Killick Millard acknowledged the militarist argument and
fear of Germany among the British, noting that most nations have an “inherent desire to increase
and become greater as compared with their neighbors, and if necessary at the expense of their
neighbors.” This was often considered and taught as patriotism, but Millard described it as a
pseudo-patriotism, which threatened world peace. “All through the world’s history, ever since the
herdsmen of Lot strove with those of Abraham, one of the fundamental and predisposing causes
of war, apart from immediate and personal causes, has been the pressure of increasing populations
and the desire for national expansion.” He added, quoting a recent Birth Rate Commission report,
“A pressure of population in any country brings as its chief historic consequence overflows and
19
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migrations into neighboring or other accessible countries, not only for peaceful settlement,
but also for conquest and for the subjugation and exploitation of the weaker peoples. This
always remains a chief cause of international dispute and wars.”22 Millard contended that German
dreams of national expansion and world supremacy were fostered and encouraged by the rapid
growth in population, due primarily to its high birth rate in the late nineteenth century. Quoting
from the first chapter of Prince von Bulow’s 1913 Imperial Germany, entitled “Germany’s
Struggle for World Power,” which justified a shift from Bismarck’s Continental Policy to one of
expansion, Millard wrote,
The course of events has long driven German policy out from the narrow confines of
Europe into the wider world. It was not ambitious restlessness which urged us to imitate
the Great Powers that had long ago embarked on world politics. The strength of the Nation
. . . as it grew, burst the bounds of its old home, and its policy was dictated by the new
interests and needs.

He also quoted from a 1916 Berliner Post opinion piece:
Can a great and rapidly growing nation like Germany always renounce all claims to further
development or to the expansion of its political power? The final settlement with France
and England, the expansion of our colonial possessions in order to create new German
homes for the overflow of our population . . . these are the problems which must be faced
in the near future.23

At the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference held in London in 1922,
Swedish physician Anton Nyström reinforced the neo-Malthusian view that contraception could
well act as a preventive of birth and consequently overpopulation in this modern century, so that
“death-bringing” population checks of the past like wars and extermination of peoples might come
to an end. He pointed to reckless killing in the past, with examples from wars between civilized
states:
[F]or instance, when the Assyrian Empire was destroyed by the Medes and the Persians,
nearly half the population perished; hundreds of thousands of Germans were killed by the
Romans when they threatened the Roman Empire; when Carthage was taken and destroyed
by the Romans, the greater part of its 700,000 inhabitants were killed . . . The crusades led
to enormous losses of human life; the same was the case with the Europeans in the Thirty
Years War. The witch trials and the cruelties of the Inquisition led to the death of
innumerable persons, in total at least 1-1/3 million.24

Nyström warned that despite the practice of preventing births throughout history, overpopulation
won out and contributed to pressures for territory and ultimate war. Significant growth in numbers
and the need for new sources of food had driven the Germans to expand into the Roman Empire.
The same was true of Asians moving west into Europe. Colonies had served as outlets for
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overcrowded European countries, and this was the case with the British colonies in North
America. Throughout the process of expansion, European nations battled one another for
possession of colonies and colonists devastated Native populations.
Germany based its military and colonial policies on the recent increase of its population, argued
neo-Malthusians, for it saw strength in its own nation against others that did not experience so
great an increase as its own. There was no question that this was a primary cause of the outbreak
of war in Europe. If Germany had a population of 50 million instead of more than 60 million,
“there would have been no world war.”25 Social hygienist Max Gruber argued that the war was
inevitable and unavoidable due to the recent growth in Germany’s population from forty million
to eighty million. He called the war a “biological necessity.”26 Ellis added that the belligerents
responsible for initiating the war—Russia, Austria, and Serbia, in addition to Germany—had the
highest birth rates in Europe. He noted that they had not yet experienced a lowering of their birth
rates, as had occurred in other European nations in the previous century because they were among
the most backward people in Europe.27 Gruber estimated that if Germany’s population continued
to grow at the same rate that it had between 1900 and 1905, by the end of the twentieth century it
would reach 250,000,000, making it invulnerable to other nations. Ellis pointed out that Russia,
with a growing population, could indeed be a threat to Germany, and also that Germany’s birth
rate had begun to fall.28
Among the most gruesome of considerations regarding population and the categorizations of
humans in the age of modern warfare, were those using the term “cannon fodder.” Societies of the
past did argue extensively for the need to fight wars and that required military might in the form
of manpower. Neo-Malthusians following World War I recognized that new technology had
increased weaponry’s capacity for death, and maintained a modern, peaceful world should leave
no room for the idea of children as future cannon fodder. Such a notion was deemed antiquated at
best. In addition, methods of carrying out war were changing, particularly with the introduction of
air attacks. Cicely Hamilton argued that should a nation be able to engage in air warfare, “a teeming
population will be a real handicap to a belligerent nation’ and that military strategy and tactics of
the future will be directed less towards the destruction of armies in the field than towards the
terrorizing and stampeding of large masses of disorganized civilians.” She continued:
Cities and industrial districts stampeded will resolve themselves into hordes of famished
nomads—men and women who are dangerous as well as useless because deprived of their
means of livelihood. If sufficiently panic-stricken when they take flight, they will avoid
railways and roads—which are likely to be targets from the air—and not only devour the
countryside, but trample it beneath their feet. . . . In a day or two a vagrant and millionfold
starvation—grown reckless, a widespread invasion by famished plunderers, more terrible
by far than invasion by an army that is fed and disciplined.
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Hamilton decried any continued consideration of population as backup support for a nation’s
military forces. While non-combatants may have served some purpose as an auxiliary force
in the past, air warfare would instead work to destroy centers of production, sending civilians into
a state of chaos. She warned that “starvation on the run” had become the military objective of the
future, and “the aim and object of the ‘scientific’ soldier of the future will be to produce nomadic
anarchy and break an enemy Government by burdening it with useless mouths.” This would be
more effective where populations were dense.29
The discussion of warfare continued. In her presentation “War and Malthusianism,” the German
feminist and pacifist Helene Stöcker reflected on the hope she and her Malthusian colleagues had
held in 1911, before the outbreak of war, when the last international conference had been held in
Dresden. Though the war had since brought disillusionment, skepticism, and despair, they had not
been totally discouraged and she felt once again inspired by the London gathering. She
acknowledged an intensification of their efforts due to the war, saying that its destruction served
as evidence that population control was necessary. Various political parties in Europe were
demanding legalized abortion by this time. Soviets, free from religious condemnation, were
working to provide abortion access as a woman’s right to equality and as a solution to poverty and
Germans were considering the same. Stöcker reminded her audience that preventing conception
was preferable to ending a pregnancy at the very least for health reasons, arguing for more
widespread dissemination of contraceptives and contraceptive information. She also advocated for
better protections for women in the workplace, so that they would not have to labor in factory
environments proving dangerous to her health and to that of an unborn child. In addition, she
pointed to the hypocrisy of condemning abortion—considering it murder—while believing the
wartime murder of adult men natural and necessary.
For good reason, at the last German Conference of Pacifists, a Catholic chaplain received
the greatest applause when he declared he had always pleaded the following point of view:
. . . You have no right to proclaim the holiness of the unborn life of the human embryo as
long as you have not secured the protection and the inviolability of human life against the
murderous force of war.

Stöcker pointed to advances made in recognizing the benefits of birth control information since
the war and again hoped leaders would acknowledge the truth of war, that it was unnecessary and
a threat to human life and the progress of man. For those who had suggested the Great War was
necessary in moving civilization forward to the goal of peace, she quoted Napoleon, who believed
war itself did not lead to an eternal peace: “Someone said after a terrible battle, looking at the
numerous dead: ‘They will bring us through their deaths eternal peace.’ Napoleon answered, ‘I am
afraid they will keep it for themselves.’” Stöcker added, “It is the Living’s turn to make use of this
knowledge so terrible confirmed by the last war.”30
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So convinced were neo-Malthusians gathered at the Fifth International Conference that
overpopulation contributed to war, that Harold Cox, president of the “National and
International” session put forth the following resolution:
The Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference calls attention now
to the generally admitted fact that over-population due to high birth rates is the most potent
cause of international rivalry and war. It also wishes to point out that mere numbers are not
an effective protection to a nation in the event of war, as modern warfare is becoming more
and more a question of science and engineering directed and carried out by highly trained
individuals. The three conditions for securing universal peace and national security are (a)
the limitation of the birth rate of each country to its area and resources, (b) increase of
racial efficiency through abstention of reproduction of the unfit, and (c) development of
international law and international co-operation in place of national rivalries.
It therefore calls upon the Governments of all nations to promote the extension of Birth
Control knowledge, especially among their least efficient inhabitants, and urges the League
of Nations to proclaim as a general principle that increase of numbers is not to be regarded
as a justification for national expansion, but that each nation should limit its numbers to its
own resources.31

The Fifth International Conference marked a notable intersection among the history of birth
control, First World War, and peace efforts. It was there that leaders articulated, with a greater
degree of evidence in their minds, the many ways in which population issues related to war in the
modern era. Their case for wider access to contraception in both the developed and less developed
world was fortified by world events, as tragic as they were. Though the League of Nations did not
fully embrace birth control policies, the United Nations made them a key part of their efforts
following the Second World War and into the twenty-first century.

31

Raymond Pierpont, ed., Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference (London:
William Heinemann, 1922), p. 195.
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